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Comment James M. Poterba
This chapter makes an important contribution to the rapidly-growing lit-
erature on the ﬁnancial market consequences of demographic change. It is
both technically sophisticated and substantively important. The technical
innovations include the construction of a multicountry overlapping gener-
ation (OLG) model that is solved under the assumption of perfect foresight
and the careful modeling of uncertainty in the labor income process facing
individuals. Allowing such uncertainty induces both precautionary as well
as life-cycle motives for individual saving, thereby moving beyond many
previous studies that have counterfactually assumed that there are no in-
tergenerational wealth transfers.
The substantively important conclusions in this chapter concern the im-
pact of demographic change on wages, the return to capital, and the pat-
tern of international capital ﬂows. There is broad theoretical consensus on
the direction of change in each of these variables that follows from a decline
in the birth rate and a corresponding increase in average population age.
Yet whether the resulting eﬀects are likely to be large or small is critically
important for a range of issues, including the structure of long-term ﬁscal
policy and the appropriate level of saving by households that are preparing
for retirement. Simulation models are the best way to develop reliable an-
swers to questions about the magnitude of the eﬀects of population aging,
but one always worries that these models may neglect important factors
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dresses a number of concerns that have been raised with earlier simulation
studies, and in the process, provides greater conﬁdence about the likely
quantitative importance of the ﬁnancial market consequences and other
eﬀects of population aging.
The authors divide the developed world into three “nations”: the United
States, the European Union (EU), and the rest of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They draw population
projections by age from United Nations benchmark forecasts, and they
ﬁnd the transition paths of the three economies over the next forty-ﬁve
years given the projected age structure. They solve the model to evaluate
the “autarky” case for the United States, and they compare this outcome
with the result when there are capital ﬂows between the three hypothetical
“countries.” They also introduce a stylized Social Security system into each
country. Because current tax and beneﬁt structures are not sustainable in
many nations, including the United States, the authors consider several
ways of restoring balance to the Social Security system, and they evaluate
the economic eﬀects of each alternative. One of the key contributions of the
analysis is the quantiﬁcation of the diﬀerential eﬀects of restoring Social
Security balance by changing the replacement rate for retirees, and restor-
ing balance by increasing tax rates, on wages, rates of return to capital, and
cohort-speciﬁc welfare.
The baseline ﬁndings suggest that the demographic transition that is al-
ready underway is likely to reduce the rate of return to capital. While the
magnitude of this decline depends on the degree of capital market open-
ness, a decline of 50 basis points appears possible in the next two decades,
and 90 basis points in the next half century. There are also important
changes in the economywide average real wage, stemming from variation
in the capital-labor ratio over time. Comparison of closed-economy results
for an economy like the United States, and open-economy results for a hy-
pothetical global economy that combines the United States, the EU, and
the rest of the OECD, shows substantial ﬂuctuations in the U.S. capital ac-
count as a result of demographic change. In the near term, global demo-
graphic pressures encourage the United States to import capital because
the rest of the OECD is, on average, older than the United States and,
therefore, has a greater domestic capital to labor ratio. One virtue of the
simulation model in this chapter is the careful quantiﬁcation of the impor-
tance of capital market openness.
The model begins with hypothetical households that make labor supply
and saving decisions and that face wage shocks. Such disaggregate model-
ing makes it possible to evaluate how population aging will aﬀect hypo-
thetical households of diﬀerent ages in 2007, as well as households that
have, as a result of their past earnings shocks, accumulated diﬀerent levels
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cohort-speciﬁc welfare eﬀects associated with population aging. They
quantify the extent to which individuals born into large cohorts, like the
baby boomers, suﬀer from reduced lifetime utility as a result of lower life-
time wages, the consequence of supplying labor when it is plentiful, as well
as lower rates of return on their investments. The central ﬁndings suggest
that while those in large cohorts are less well oﬀ than those in smaller co-
horts, the adverse eﬀect translates to a reduction in lifetime consumption
of less than 1 percent, and, in some cases, less than one-half of 1 percent.
Within the cohort that is currently alive and working, the cost of prospec-
tive population aging is greatest for those who have substantial wealth
holdings. Substantial wealth-holders lose the most from the demography-
induced decline in rates of return.
This chapter is among the ﬁrst to oﬀer insights on the disaggregate pat-
terns within cohorts of the welfare changes associated with population ag-
ing. This is an important contribution, and it should spur substantial further
work. There is great heterogeneity in wealth holdings, wage rates, and other
attributes that aﬀect lifetime utility within cohorts. The diﬀerences in the
eﬀects of population aging within cohorts may be as large as the diﬀerences
across cohorts, and this chapter begins the analysis of such diﬀerences.
One of the chapter’s most important innovations is the introduction of
stylized Social Security programs in each nation and the analysis of how
changes in Social Security policy might attenuate or reinforce the conse-
quences of population aging. The authors identify a key interaction be-
tween the generosity of the publicly provided pay-as-you-go Social Secu-
rity system and the aggregate eﬀects of population aging on ﬁnancial
market returns. If the Social Security system is reformed in a way that re-
duces the generosity of the unfunded public program at the same time the
demographic shift is increasing the capital-labor ratio in the economy, this
will exacerbate the downward pressure on returns associated with popula-
tion aging. The key assumption underlying this result is the crowd-out of
private capital accumulation by the Social Security program. Any Social
Security reform that induces more private saving will reinforce the increase
in saving associated with population aging. Within cohorts, the house-
holds with substantial wealth will be most aﬀected by the changes in
wealth accumulation associated with Social Security reform because they
have the largest interest in prospective returns.
One of the important conclusions of the Social Security analysis is that
demographic changes have a larger eﬀect on welfare in the presence of un-
funded retirement income programs than in the absence of such programs.
When the population ages in a nation with a pay-as-you-go Social Security
system, preserving ﬁscal stability requires either beneﬁt reductions or
higher taxes. Regardless of which alternative policymakers choose, there
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the demographic transition. This chapter traces through the economic
eﬀects of each of these alternatives. Within the set of beneﬁt reductions, it
distinguishes between a policy of raising the retirement age and one of pre-
serving the retirement age but adopting a lower income replacement rate.
The analysis provides valuable evidence on how the alternative policies will
aﬀect both the distribution of welfare across cohorts as well as the pattern
of lifetime utility levels within cohorts.
By embedding a hypothetical “U.S. economy” in a hypothetical “global”
economy, the chapter provides important insights about the economic
eﬀects of global aging. The presence of international capital markets
makes the rate of return in a given economy a function not only of its own
demographic mix, but also of that in other nations. One interesting con-
clusion for those concerned about population aging in the United States is
that international capital ﬂows accentuate, rather than reduce, the down-
ward prospective pressure on rates of return because the rest of the OECD,
on average, ages faster and more dramatically than the United States. The
chapter nevertheless shows that the welfare consequences of working with
a closed-economy rather than an open-economy model are small. This is
precisely the type of quantitative evidence that makes this simulation exer-
cise so valuable.
While there is much to applaud about the open-economy modeling in
this chapter, this aspect of the analysis also raises questions that require
further attention. One potentially important shortcoming of the current
model is the omission of developing countries, particularly the BRICs
(Brazil, Russia, India, and China). These countries are likely to experience
rapid economic growth over the next few decades, and they may emerge as
important suppliers of global ﬁnancial capital by 2050. Even though they
account for a relatively small fraction of global capital supply today, their
rapid growth and their prospective aging make them important compo-
nents of any long-term analysis. Thus, while the near-term ﬁndings, those
for the next ten to twenty years, may not be particularly sensitive to the
omission of these countries, the longer-term results could be aﬀected by
this modeling assumption.
Considering the role of the BRICs in the current model underscores the
uncertainties of any long-horizon projection such as the one developed
here. Once one recognizes that the eﬀect of population aging in the devel-
oped world on asset returns in 2050 is likely to depend on the intervening
growth rate of the BRICs, one realizes that some parameters that are very
diﬃcult to predict—such as that growth rate—may be consequential for
the modeling exercise. Even in developed countries, there are important
uncertainties that should be recognized. The average age at retirement in
the United States fell by ﬁve years between 1950 and 2000, yet in the cur-
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dramatic change would not occur. Yet substantial changes could occur
within the forecast horizon, and they could result in substantial diver-
gences from the baseline analysis.
One of the most intriguing possibilities is a link between aggregate popu-
lation age structure and the rate of productivity growth. Because demo-
graphic changes like those considered in this chapter take place over decades,
any change in the rate of productivity growth over the simulation period can
have large cumulative eﬀects. This draws attention to potential shifts in the
rate of productivity growth, which is treated as exogenous in this model. If
older workers are more reliable, absent less often, and more committed to
their jobs, this may lead to higher productivity growth when the average age
in the workforce is higher and, consequently, alter the standard of living for
households alive in 2050. Because there is little empirical evidence on the na-
ture of such linkages, it would be premature for the authors to attempt to
capture such eﬀects in their modeling. However, recognizing the possibility
of such eﬀects suggests that all long-horizon simulation results should be
viewed with some caution. This warning does does not diminish the impor-
tance of using simulation tools to evaluate how various policy interventions
or other shocks might aﬀect the evolution of the economy.
Another potential extension of the model, like including the BRICs,
which again ﬂows naturally from the open-economy setting, is the analysis
of immigration policy. The current model takes age structure as given, so it
implicitly adopts the immigration and emigration rates assumed by the
United Nations. One way OECD countries may expand the number of
young workers and blunt the potential eﬀects of population aging is by
opening their borders to immigrants to a greater extent than they have in
the recent past. There may be important diﬀerences across nations in the
capacity to make such adjustments, and a model like the one developed
here could be used to address the resulting impact on economic circum-
stances. The treatment of immigration may be particularly important for
the analysis of Social Security programs and their impact on diﬀerent co-
horts. Institutional details matter in this context because the net eﬀect of
greater immigration on the ﬁnancial status of Social Security depends on
whether the immigrants are legal or illegal and on whether beneﬁts are paid
to individuals who return to their home country in retirement.
Another concern with this model, which could be addressed in future
work, involves the costs of raising children and the divergence between the
treatment of young and old dependents. While elderly dependents are ex-
plicitly recognized in the model because they receive Social Security bene-
ﬁts and draw down their wealth holdings, there are no children. Economic
agents are born at age twenty, fully educated and ready to enter the labor
force. In practice, countries with high birth rates usually incur substantial
costs in raising children. These costs include direct outlays for schooling,
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ity of parents. The model does not recognize that a decline in birth rates
that underlies the demographic transition of the next half century is likely
to result in reduced outlays for child-raising. Adding this eﬀect would po-
tentially raise the level of per-adult output during part of the period when
the population is aging. There are also potential eﬀects on government
budgets because governments are most directly involved in providing ser-
vices to the young and the old. An analysis that focuses only on Social Se-
curity, but neglects school spending, overstates the ﬁscal eﬀects of popula-
tion aging.
These suggestions for enhancing the model to tackle additional issues,
or to add realism on some dimensions, do not detract from the substantial
and valuable contributions of the current analysis. The authors have made
great strides in developing a realistic and insightful multicountry model
that can be used to study a wide range of diﬀerent issues relating to popu-
lation aging. I expect that this powerful new tool, which has already gen-
erated important ﬁndings in the current chapter, will in the future yield fur-
ther discoveries on a variety of other issues.
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